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The collapse of the inter-war gold standard has frequently been studied in economic his-
tory. This paper proposes a discrete time duration model to analyze how economic and polit-
ical indicators affected the length of time a country remained on the gold standard. We rely
on a panel data set of 24 countries over the years 1922-1938, and incorporate new measures of
political and institutional variables. The results of this study identify high per capita income
growth, large foreign currency and gold reserves, trade with other countries on gold, interna-
tional creditor status, and the prior experience of hyperinﬂation as factors that increased the
probability that a country would remain on gold. In contrast, democratic regimes that were
exposed to a relatively high percentage of left-wing representation in parliament left the gold
standard early. We also offer predicted survival probabilities for selected key countries on the
gold standard. These survival rates show that Britain abandoned the gold exchange standard
at a much higher survival probability, compared with other countries in the system.1 Introduction
In contrast to the classical gold standard (1870-1914), the inter-war gold standard lasted a
mere six years, before it collapsed in the early 1930s. A multitude of theories and hypotheses
address the question of why the inter-war gold exchange standard was so fragile. Economists
have traditionally cited structural problems within the system (Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo
1997), gold imbalances (Trifﬁn 1947), the lack of an international hegemon (Kindleberger
1976), or persistent deﬂation (Bernanke and James 1991, Eichengreen 1992) as possible causes.
More recently, researchers have suggested that the changing social and political structures in
the inter-war years contributed to the economic difﬁculties (Eichengreen (1992), Simmons
(1994), Tortella (2003)), arguing that the reconstruction of the gold standard as gold exchange
standard in the years following WW I was incompatible with the rise of democracy.
Thequestionofwhenandwhycountrieschoosetoabandonﬁxedexchangerateregimesis
particularly interesting with respect to the relationship between exchange rate regime choice
and the propagation of ﬁnancial crises. The inter-war gold exchange standard has been char-
acterizedbyKeynesasthe‘GoldenFetters’thathadtobeshedbyBritaintoavoidaprolonged
crisis (Keynes 1932) and thus provides an excellent example to deepen our understanding of
the factors that contribute to instabilities in ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
Thispaperoffersarigorousapproachtosimultaneouslytesttheinﬂuenceofeconomicand
political factors on the disintegration of the inter-war gold standard in a dynamic framework.
The dynamic approach allows one to model the timing of when countries chose to leave the
regime. It is implemented by applying a duration model of 24 countries. Political factors are
integrated through a partisan veto player approach following Tsebelis (1995). Moreover, we
explicitly model the survival probabilities of different countries on the gold standard over
time, emphasizing that the choice to leave the regime was taken at very different survival
rates by various countries.
We ﬁnd that high per capita growth, large foreign currency and gold reserves, trade with
other countries on gold, international creditor status, and the prior experience of hyperinﬂa-
tion extended the time a country would remain on gold. In contrast, democracy, a relatively
high percentage of left-wing representation in parliament, sterling bloc membership, and
high inﬂation rates shortened the time a country would stay on the gold standard. Also,
1from our analysis Britain could be characterized as a fair weather friend that left the gold
standard when it had a 60% survival probability, while other key countries in the system
remained on gold until survival probabilities had fallen below 20%.
2 The Inter-war Gold Exchange Standard - A Brief History
By the end of WW I most countries that had previously adhered to the gold standard had
abandoned their peg to gold. Exchange rates were freely ﬂoating and extremely volatile. In
search for a new monetary order, governments and central bankers demanded an interna-
tional currency system with stable exchange rates. There was a longing for the pre-war order
of the classical gold standard that had promoted trade, ﬁnancial integration, and prosper-
ity.1 But ofﬁcials hesitated to re-instate the pre-war system, out of fear that the gold standard
restoration would induce a global shortage of gold. Wartime inﬂation had shifted price lev-
els, so that for many countries a return to gold at the pre-war parity would have implied
an overvaluation of their currencies. Thus, the pressure to return to pre-war parities would
induce deﬂation and delay reconstruction and the resumption of economic growth. A return
at new exchange rates, in contrast, might have worsened a worldwide gold scramble and
would have raised questions about the credibility of the new regime.2
The establishment of an inter-war monetary system was further complicated by a num-
ber of historical events, the most important of which was the problem of post-war reparation
payments (Kindleberger 1993). Although the peace treaties held Germany and its allies re-
sponsible for the war and burdened them with reparation payments, the actual amount of
the payments was negotiated country by country throughout the early 1920s. The reparation
demands of the war ’winners’ and the ofﬁcial judgement of what the ’losers’ would be able
to pay differed widely. For Germany the large reparation demands, as well as the French
commitment to extract them by force, led to a devastating budget situation and accelerated
the hyperinﬂation (Holtfrerich 1986).
1An explicit discussion of how the classical gold standard promoted trade and ﬁnancial integration can be
found, for example, in O’Rourke and Williamson (1999).
2For an explicit discussion of the credibility of the inter-war gold exchange standard, refer to Bordo, Edelstein
and Rockoff (1999).
2Moreover, the war-torn economies of Europe were in dire need for international support
to ﬁnance reconstruction, but the war had left the major powers entangled in a web of ac-
cumulated debts. The United States had advanced to be the major creditor to Europe and
was the only country economically capable of granting ﬁnancial assistance in the immediate
post-war years.
The emergence of the inter-war gold standard was linked to the adoption of gold by
Britain in April 1925. By then, Britain felt pressured to return to gold, as other countries
were contemplating the stabilization of their currencies. Without Britain on gold, the adop-
tion of gold as monetary anchor by other countries would have implied a further shift of gold
reserves and deposits away from London and to New York. To halt the gold outﬂow, Britain
returned to gold at the pre-war parity, a choice that was regarded as a key signal of stability
and credibility for the new system. In fact, already by the end of the year 1925, a number of
countries had adopted gold as their monetary anchor again. Figure 1 shows the emergence
of the gold standard during the late 1920’s for the 24 countries used in this analysis. The sys-
tem began to build slowly in the 1920s, spread more quickly after Britain’s adoption of gold
in 1925, and reached its height in the years 1927–1931. It then fell apart in the 1930s. Table
1 lists when the individual countries included in this analysis adopted and abandoned the
gold exchange standard.
The inter-war gold standard operated as an exchange standard system centered around
key currencies. Adopting the gold standard brought stability to the international ﬁnancial
markets and introduced a brief period of economic growth. Nevertheless the system could
not repeat the classical gold standard’s success and problems of operation soon became ap-
parent. Relations between the U.S. and Britain were tainted by differing ideas over the merits
of the gold exchange standard over the pure gold standard and worsened after Benjamin
Strong’s death in 1928 (Clarke 1967). At the same time Britain and France continued to com-
pete for dominance in Europe. These difﬁculties restricted the ability of the monetary system
to respond effectively to world-wide economic problems.
33 The Fragility of the Inter-war System
Avarietyofargumentshave beenusedtoexplain theinter-warsystem’sfragilityand itsshort
operation time. The following section differentiates between economic arguments on the one
hand and political and institutional factors on the other.
3.1 Economic Arguments
Already in 1947, Trifﬁn pointed to the instabilities of the inter-war system. The exchange
nature of the gold standard limited the overall gold needs of the system, but it also led to
an inherent imbalance. The system placed pressure on the center countries to maintain their
gold convertibility, but countries on the periphery, that held their reserves in the currencies of
the center countries, possessed no enforcement mechanism over the center countries. As the
world economy grew, and with it the demand for reserve currency, the center countries were
tempted to increase their money stock. But increasing the liquidity of the reserve currency, in
turn, entailed the risk of a crisis of conﬁdence for the entire system because it jeopardized the
center currencies’ link to gold.3
Besides this inherent ﬂaw in the system’s design, the inter-war system was also charac-
terized by structural problems and persistent gold imbalances between the center countries
(Temin 1989). France and the U.S. had policies to sterilize gold inﬂows, leading to the ac-
cumulation of gold reserves in both countries. Britain, in contrast, suffered from large gold
outﬂows. Unfortunately, the adjustment mechanism of the gold standard did not succeed
in eliminating these balance of payments surpluses and deﬁcits. Deﬁcit countries were con-
strained by reserve losses and had to deﬂate in order to maintain ﬁxed parities. Surplus coun-
tries by contrast allowed their foreign investments to increase without making an upward
adjustment in their money supply or price levels. This led to a steady decline in world prices
contributing to the problem of widespread deﬂation (Eichengreen 1992). Simmons (1996) fur-
thermore speciﬁes that the growth of central bank independence in the years following WW
I contributed to the growing deﬂation problem. Independent central banks, being concerned
about inﬂation, put an extreme focus on price stability, thereby reinforcing the deﬂation that
3This effect is often cited with respect to currency blocs, especially the Sterling bloc. A recent discussion on
the importance of these currency blocs can be found in Ritschl and Wolff (2004).
4was already present through the limited availability of gold.
The gold imbalances observed for the inter-war years document the lack of cooperation
between central banks. While during the classical gold standard years countries in ﬁnan-
cial difﬁculties could borrow from their neighbors, this international support was no longer
available in the years after the war.4 A gold shortage in one country could therefore turn into
a crisis of conﬁdence for the entire system, rather than being solved cooperatively. This lack
of leadership has also been associated with the shift of ﬁnancial power from London to New
York which eliminated England’s capacity to maintain global balance through movements of
its discount rate (Kindleberger 1976).
More recently, Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) have characterized the difﬁcul-
ties of the inter-war standard as classical open economy trilemma, namely the inability of
policy makers to simultaneously pursue a ﬁxed exchange rate, open capital markets, and
autonomous monetary policy. The open economy imposes constraints on domestic policy




Simmons (1994), and more recently Tortella (2003) and Voth (2003). While Voth illustrates the
importance of political events and their transmission to the stock markets, Eichengreen and
Tortella both focus on the extension of the political franchise to the working class. This new
political environment changed the willingness of governments to place external adjustment
over the domestic concerns of rising unemployment and economic inequality. Especially
heavily indebted small open economies could only rely on expanded exports and limited
imports to defend gold convertibility. But falling commodity prices in the late 1920s made
this strategy difﬁcult to maintain and forced countries to suspend external debt service or
abandon the gold standard. If governments were willing to let the exchange rate depreciate,
they would not be forced to pursue policies designed to compress domestic spending. On
the other hand, convertibility served as a signal of conﬁdence for domestic savers and inter-
4Britain for example did so during the Baring Crisis in 1890 (Triner and Wandschneider 2006).
5national investors (Eichengreen 1992). Table 1shows how countries actually chose different
ways of leaving the regime. In particular, countries with large outstanding external debts,
such as Austria and Germany, opted for exchange controls before ofﬁcial suspension to not
increase their liabilities.
According to Simmons (1994), democratic regimes and countries with a higher degree of
opennessweremorelikelytoleavethegoldstandard. Incontrast, centralbankindependence,
higher net national product, a greater net external investment position and a higher left-wing
participation in government increased a country’s probability of staying on gold. Simmons’
study is the closest example for the analysis carried out in this paper, the main empirical
difference being that her ﬁndings are based an a static probit model, rather than a dynamic
framework as applied in this article. Our analysis conﬁrms Simmons’ ﬁndings with respect to
democracy, national productand the investment position, but our resultsdifferwith regardto
the inﬂuence of trade, central bank independence and left-wing participation. Moreover our
analysis explicitly models the survival probabilities of key countries on the gold standard, an
extension only possible in the dynamic framework.
The interpretation of political pressure and its effects on the stability of the regime can be
related to some of the recent literature on exchange rate regime choice, currency crises and the
relationship between institutions and economic outcomes. Several researchers, among them
Drazen (1999), Bernhard and Leblang (2002), Leblang (2003), and Persson and Tabellini (2003)
have pointed out that the decision to leave an exchange rate regime is not only an economic
but also a political question. Factors that matter for the willingness to defend or devalue a
currency are electoral timing, constituent interests, and government partisanship. The desire
to defend the existing regime often increases in the run-up to an election, but falls with the
arrival of a new government or new political regime. Abandoning the peg often comes with
voter disapproval and loss of pride.
Government partisanship relates to the idea that parties on the left place more emphasis
on employment and income distribution while parties on the right are more concerned with
ﬁghting inﬂation and maintaining price stability (Leblang 2003). Therefore left of center po-
litical parties might be more responsive to the the demands of the domestic working class
and place internal stimulation of the economy over external balance. Sometimes however a
reverse effect can be observed, where left of center governments hold onto ﬁxed exchange
6rate regimes as a signal for their commitment to external stability (Bernhard, Broz and Clark
2002). During the inter-war years, many governments were bound by coalition agreements or
were in a minority governing position, which restricted their policy choices and might have
induced left of center governments to behave more centrist, or right of center governments
to be more socialist. Ritschl (2002), for example, describes the case of Germany following the
September 1930 elections. The centrist government led by Br¨ uning was squeezed between
the demands of the Social Democrats on the left and the advances of the NSDAP on the right
of the political spectrum. Similarly, Eichengreen (1992) outlines in detail the deadlock in the
British parliament on the decision to abandon the gold standard. The reigning labor gov-
ernment was incapable of remedying the budgetary problems and was therefore forced to
abandon the gold standard regime.
The empirical analysis in this study highlights the importance of democracy when an-
alyzing the fragility of the inter-war years. We explore a new way of integrating political
instability by creating a partisan veto player variable that includes the number of parties in-
cluded in a governing coalition. Following Tsebelis (1995), a veto player is deﬁned as an
individual or collective whose agreement is required for a policy decision. The characteriza-
tion of different veto players captures the various interest groups and their relative inﬂuence
over the policy making process. Rather than taking all political decisions as ’either-or’ cases,
accounting for the presence of several veto players allows us to assess the overall potential for
political change. In general, political stability increases with the number of veto players, but
for the inter-war years a rising number of veto players can also indicate political deadlock,
such as in Weimar Germany.
4 Empirical Analysis
In the following we use duration analysis to test for the effects of various political and eco-
nomic indicators on the stability of the gold exchange system. Duration models estimate the
association between explanatory variables and the time conditional probability (hazard rate)
of making a transition from one state to another. They use the cross-sectional and time series
variation in the explanatory variables to identify the relationship between the covariates and
the event of interest. Duration models therefore allow us to incorporate the dynamic nature
7of the problem when looking at the timing of devaluations.
Duration analysis is employed in labor economics to analyze employment spells5, but it
has recently found applications in international economics, as well as in economic history.
Meissner (2005) analyzes the timing of adoption of the classical gold standard post 1870.
His ﬁndings conclude that trade networks and better access to capital markets determined a
country’s choice to join the gold standard and led to early adoption of the regime. Bratberg,
Legernes and Vardal (1999) focus on the decline of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes in the post
Bretton Woods period. In their analysis a country’s size, its inﬂation differential with the rest
of the world, and its openness are the primary factors to explain the regime choice. Other
examples of duration models in an international economics context include Sosvilla-Rivero
and Maroto-Illera (2003), and Joyce (2003).
The present duration analysis focuses on the time conditional probability that a country
wouldleavethegoldstandardintimeperiodt. Forthissampleofcountries, allcountriesstart
in the ﬁxed exchange rate regime and only transition once to a ﬂoating regime. We can there-
fore limit the empirical analysis to a single event. Moreover, for the purpose of this analysis,
leaving the gold standard regime is deﬁned as either ofﬁcially announcing the abandoning
of gold as monetary anchor, imposing exchange controls, or suspending convertibility. Dif-
ferentiating between these choices would have severely constrained the sample, but presents
an interesting avenue for future research.
For a standard continuous time duration model, let T be a random variable with density
function f(t) and distribution function F(t). Consider the conditional density of devaluation,
i.e. abandoning the gold standard, given that devaluation has not yet occurred up to time t.
The survival function is then given by:
S(t) = 1 ¡ F(t) = P[T > t]; (1)





For the inter-war period, data limitations do not allow us to take into account the exact date
5See for example Meyer (1990)
8on which a country abandoned the gold exchange standard. Thus the dependent variable
is grouped in annual intervals. It is therefore necessary to work with discrete hazard rates.
Jenkins (1995) illustrates how continuous time duration models can be transformed to dis-
crete time. Let the discrete hazard ht be the probability that a transition occurs in the interval
[t;t+1), conditional on no transition until time t. The discrete time hazard for each country i
is then given by
ht(Xit) = 1 ¡ expf¡expfX
0
itb + µ(t)gg; (3)
where Xit is a vector of covariates summarizing the observed differences between countries,
b is a vector of parameters to be estimated and µ(t) is a function describing the duration
dependence in the hazard rate. The above hazard function takes a complementary log log
form and can be interpreted as the discrete time model to the underlying continuous time
proportional hazards model.
Given the historical context of the timing of countries leaving the gold exchange standard
(compare Figure 1), we adopt a Weibull parametrization of the hazard rate in the following
analysis.6 For the discrete approximation of the Weibull parametrization a variable log(time)
is generated which is a function of survival time t per country. A model with baseline hazard
µ(t) = (q ¡ 1)ln(t) can be estimated by including log(time) as regressor. Following Jenkins











log(1 ¡ hit); (4)
where yit = 1 if t = ¿ + st and yit = 0 otherwise. Note that this log-likelihood function has
the same form as the ‘standard’ log-likelihood function for the regression analysis of a binary
variable.
6The Weibull parametrization of the hazard rate for continuous time models is generally described in the
following form. The hazard rate can be written as h(t) = ptp¡1[exp(x(t)0¯)]; where p and ¯ are the parameters
to be estimated. If p > 1 the hazard rate increases over time, for p < 1 the hazard rate decreases over time, and
for p = 1 the hazard is constant (exponential hazard). The parameter p is comparable to q ¡ 1 in the discrete
approximation. Moreover, x(t) is a vector of time-varying covariates and ¯ is a vector of parameters describing
the magnitude of the association between covariates and the hazard rate, t is the time at observation.
95 The Data
In all of the following analysis, we begin with a set of 24 sample countries as deﬁned in Table
1. The overall time period of estimation comprises the years 1922-1938, but for the individual
countries only the years between entering and exiting the gold standard regime are taken
into account. This generates a total number of 162 years at risk for our sample. The average
time a country remained on gold was 6.75 years. Two countries in the sample, Portugal and
Yugoslavia, both adopted the gold standard for only one year. The U.S., the Netherlands, and
Switzerland remained on gold the longest, with each 12 years.7
We test the various economic explanations of the gold standard’s collapse, controlling
for the level of GDP per capita, changes in gold, silver, and foreign asset reserves, trade
relations, discount rate movements and inﬂation rates. All variables are explained in the
Appendix. Moreover, Table 2 summarizes all economic and political explanatory variables
and their hypothesized effects. GDP per capita, for example, captures a wealth effect that had
already been observed by Meissner (2005) for the classical gold standard. Relatively wealthy
countries were less exposed to domestic pressures and therefore found it easier to remain
within the system. Also for the inter-war years, countries that were less affected by the Great
Depression experienced smaller declines in GDP growth rates and thus less pressure to leave
theregime. WewouldthereforeexpecthigherpercapitaGDPgrowthtoextendthetimethata
country would remain on gold. Including gold reserves tests the hypothesis that imbalanced
reserves contributed to the regime’s fragility. High reserves should increase the probability
that a country could remain on the regime. Countries that accumulated gold were able to
sustain the system, whereas those losing gold were not.
For this analysis, a trade network variable is included, measured as trade with countries
on gold as percentage of total trade. Fixed exchange rate regimes promote trade ﬂows by
removing the exchange rate risk. The trade relations variable captures the idea that a country
might have had a greater incentive to hold onto the regime to increase trade if the majority
of the country’s trading partners were also on the gold standard. One would therefore ex-
pect a higher percentage of trade with gold standard countries to increase the duration that
7The U.S. is the only country within the sample that is on the gold standard before 1922. For the purpose of
this analysis the U.S. is counted as being on gold for a total of 12 years, from 1922 to 1933.
10a country would remain on gold.8 For the inter-war years we also know that many countries
engaged in competitive devaluations. Trade could therefore also be negatively related to gold
adherence. By the early 1930s the importance of world trade for the international system had
declined dramatically. Before opting for devaluation, many countries had tried to expand ex-
ports and limit imports to improve their foreign currency reserves. These import restrictions
and prohibitive tariffs led to a world-wide decline in trade (Eichengreen 1992).
Including the average annual discount rate tests the question whether countries played by
the ‘rules of the game’ and adjusted interest rates to maintain external balance. If countries
played by the rules of the game, we would expect to see higher interest rates for the countries
leaving the regime, meaning they exhausted the interest instrument in trying to defend the
gold standard. Nurkse (1944) and Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman (1985) suggest that
this apparently was not the case. The most famous example for this type of behavior is Great
Britain, which left the gold standard in September of 1931 with a bank rate of 4:5%.9 The
inﬂation variable, measured as percentage deviation from average inﬂation tests the argu-
ments made by Bernanke and James (1991) and Simmons (1996) that deﬂation destabilized
the regime. Countries suffering from deﬂation might be induced to leave the regime.
Additionaleconomicvariablesincludeatimevaryingdummyforbankingcrises, adummy
variable indicating whether a country had experienced a hyperinﬂation in the immediate
post-war period, a dummy variable indicating whether a country had been a net creditor
throughout the inter-war period, and the percentage of unemployed for some of the coun-
tries included. We would expect that a higher incidence of banking crises, as well as higher
unemployment rates, increased the likelihood that a country would leave the regime. The ex-
ample of Austria illustrates nicely how domestic banking crises could drain a country of its
reserves and then force it to abandon the monetary regime (Schubert 1991). Likewise, higher
unemployment increased the domestic pressures to place internal over external adjustment.
Moreover, the variables banking crisis and unemployment, together with the GDP growth
rate, control for the severity with which a country was hit by the Great Depression. Creditor
8Including an openness measure computed as imports and exports divided by GDP in addition as well as
instead of the trade network variable did not yield meaningfully different results.
9The Bank of England raised the discount rate from 4:5% to 6% on September 21, 1931, as it was leaving the
gold standard.
11status should decrease the probability that a country would leave the gold standard. The in-
cidence of hyperinﬂation prior to the gold standard might induce countries to adhere to the
regime in order to sustain credibility.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the complete data set. The period of estimation is
the country year. For the economic variables, the summary statistics conﬁrm the prevalence
of deﬂation and the high variance in countries’ reserve stocks. Moreover, the relatively high
average unemployment of 12% stands out.
Institutional variables include a measure for central bank independence; a regime classi-
ﬁcation of democracies versus non-democracies; and a classiﬁcation variable that accounts
for the fact that at the time countries were grouped in currency blocs that might have inﬂu-
enced their decision making over gold standard adherence. Simmons (1994) suggests that
the inter-war regime was upheld by independent central banks committed to the regime. In
recent times, independent central banks are often associated with low inﬂation policies. This
relationship cannot be conﬁrmed for the inter-war years.10 We also include a time varying
democracy dummy to account for the fact that in democracies, domestic pressures to leave
the gold standard in the face of an economic crisis should be higher than in authoritarian
regimes. We can see that for the sample, about three quarters of all observations are classiﬁed
as democracies. Currency blocs are included through a dummy variable indicating member-
ship in the sterling bloc.
A second set of regressions focuses exclusively on the subset of democracies as opposed
to the authoritarian regimes in the sample. In this subset, we include a time varying dummy
indicating whether a country had a left of center government, the proportion of left of center
parties in parliament, as well as a partisan veto player variable, indicating the number of par-
ties in the governing coalition. It is important to distinguish between a left of center govern-
ment and the proportion of left of center votes in parliament, to account for leftist pressures
that were not reﬂected in the choice of government. In general, left of center governments
and parties should be more receptive to the demands of the working class, and thus should
be more likely to abandon the regime in a situation when domestic interests collide with the
10Compare Rogoff (1985) and Cukierman (1992), who ﬁnd that central bank independence can be related to
lower inﬂation. A scatter plot of inﬂation versus central bank independence for the countries included in this
analysis actually suggests no systemic relationship between central bank independence and inﬂation.
12demands of maintaining the exchange rate regime. For our sample about half the observa-
tions show a left of center government and left of center representation in parliament is about
40%. We also account for the strength of the executive and the number of cabinet changes in a
given year. Countries with coalition governments of multiple veto players should display in-
creased political stability, reducing the probability of a regime change. Multiple veto players
also capture the fragmentation of many of the young democracies, especially in east and cen-
tral Europe during the inter-war years. These fragmented democracies usually had a more
difﬁcult time withstanding leftist pressures, which might have increased their probability of
leaving the monetary regime. The effect of the partisan veto player variable on gold standard
duration might therefore be ambiguous (compare Table 2).
6 Results from the Full Sample
Table 4 shows the regression results for six different speciﬁcations of the duration regression.
For all speciﬁcations the coefﬁcient q ¡ 1 on log(time) in the baseline hazard function is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant and takes values greater than one. This conﬁrms the increasing hazard
assumption.
Speciﬁcation1 is the baseline regression, wherethe decision to leave is purely a function of
the log of per capita GDP, the percentage change in gold reserves, and a democracy dummy.
This model captures the generic arguments. Higher GDP per capita as well as rising gold
reserves decreased the probability of failure. A one percent increase in GDP would decrease
by 1.97 percent the hazard of the country leaving the gold standard. Being classiﬁed as a
democracy, in contrast, increased the probability that a country would abandon the regime
by 1.2 percent. All three variables are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% and 10%, respectively. The
result that democratic regimes were more likely to leave the system conﬁrms the arguments
made by Eichengreen (1992), Simmons (1994) and Tortella (2003).
Speciﬁcation 2 then extends the baseline model by including institutional determinants
of the gold standard, such as adherence to the sterling bloc and a measure for central bank
independence. Sterling bloc adherence is marginally signiﬁcant, indicating that countries
with close ties to Britain had a 0:95% increased hazard of leaving the gold standard. The
central bank independence measure is unrelated to gold standard adherence. Speciﬁcations
133 to 6 include the economic variables for inﬂation, trade network, discount rate adjustments,
experience of banking crises, hyperinﬂation, creditor status and unemployment. Higher in-
ﬂation increased by 0.2 percent the hazard that a country would leave the gold standard,
while increased trade with countries on the gold standard, prior experience of hyperinﬂa-
tion, and creditor status reduced the hazard by 0:05% , 1:71%, and 1:91%, respectively, and
thereby and increased the probability of adherence to the regime. The inﬂation result contra-
dicts the hypothesis by Bernanke and James (1991) that deﬂation contributed to the failure
of the regime. But looking at inﬂation rates over time, we know that countries inﬂated as
they left the regime. Since the analysis is based on annual data, it is possible that inﬂating af-
ter abandoning the regime is misinterpreted here as leading to the abandonment.11 The trade
network variable suggests that even though the importance of trade was declining during the
inter-war years, trade was still a factor motivating countries to commit to the gold standard.
Creditor status and the experience of hyperinﬂation increased the time that a country
would remain on the gold standard. The creditor variable supports the result on gold re-
serves and reﬂects that creditor countries had an interest in fully recapturing their loans. The
hyperinﬂation result suggests that countries that had experienced hyperinﬂation in the im-
mediate post-war period were holding onto the regime to import credibility. This result is
even stronger if one considers that both of the democratic countries that had experienced hy-
perinﬂation in the immediate post-war period, Austria and Germany, were also among the
ﬁrst countries to adopt the inter-war gold standard in the early 1920s. Moreover, qualita-
tive evidence suggests that countries that had experienced hyperinﬂation were more likely to
adopt exchange controls when leaving the regime.
Variables that did not affect a country’s decision whether to remain on gold or abandon
the regime include discount rate adjustments, the experience of banking crises and unem-
ployment. The effect of the banking crises might already be captured in the reserves variable
and thus not register separately. The insigniﬁcance of the discount variable underscores that
countries did not use the discount tool to fend off gold losses and remain within the regime.
Regarding unemployment, it is relatively difﬁcult to collect reliable data for the inter-war
11This aggregation problem stemming from the use of annual data (the highest frequency available) is no
problem for the other explanatory variables included in the regression, since none of them experiences a change
as drastic as that of inﬂation once countries leave the regime.
14years. Often ﬁgures are only available for unionized workers, which greatly underestimate
the true unemployment numbers. It is therefore possible that the statistical insigniﬁcance on
the unemployment indicator stems from data inaccuracies.
7 Democracy and the Inter-war Gold Standard
Table5repeatstheseregressionsforthesubsetofdemocraciesinthesample, andthenextends
these models with determinants of the political system to further illustrate the inﬂuence of
the political regime over the choice of countries to remain on gold or leave the regime. Again,
all models are overall signiﬁcant and the coefﬁcient q¡1 on log time is signiﬁcant and greater
than one. Speciﬁcations 1–6 conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the full sample for the subset of democ-
racies. Speciﬁcation 7 includes measures for a left leaning government, the percentage of left
in parliament as well as the partisan veto player variable. The only signiﬁcant variable is the
percentage of left in parliament, suggesting that countries with left leaning parliaments were
more likely to leave the regime to adhere to their constituencies. A one percent increase in
left leaning representation, reduced the probability a country would remain on gold by 0.05
percent. So leftist pressures did manifest themselves in more domestically oriented policies.
The veto player variable, as well as the left orientation of government are not statistically
signiﬁcant. This might be driven by the fact that the theory on how these variables should
behave is not clear. Often, left of center governments are more responsive to domestic de-
mands, but they might also hold onto the regime to import credibility. Also, leftish pressures
in parliament affected policy decisions, regardless of whether the government had a left-
ist orientation. Likewise in speciﬁcation 8 the number of cabinet changes per year and the
strength of the executive are insigniﬁcant and appear not to have inﬂuenced the probability
of leaving the regime. In summary, while not all political measures are signiﬁcant, there was
still a sizable destabilizing effect from left of center representation in democracies.
8 Was Britain a Fair Weather Friend?
The dynamic nature of the model allows for the calibration of predicted survival rates for
individual countries in the sample. Based on the coefﬁcient estimates of Model 1 for the
15full sample (baseline model), we generate predicted values and derive the predicted survival
rates for four sample countries, Britain, the U.S., France, and Germany.12 Figure 2 shows the
survival rates for Britain and the U.S., and Figure 3 shows those for France and Germany.
For all countries, the survival rates fall drastically over the time the country is on the gold
standard, and all four countries leave the regime when the survival rates are lowest. What
is noticeable, however, is that Britain leaves the regime at a high survival rate of about 60%,
while the other three countries leave in years where survival probabilities have fallen to 20%
for France and the U.S., or even 10% in the case of Germany. While it is difﬁcult to derive
an exact benchmark of when countries should leave the regime, we can assume that once
survival rates fall below 50%, it is probably more advantageous for a country to abandon
the gold standard. The differences between the four selected countries are therefore striking
and suggest that Britain abandoned the gold standard at a time when the economic condi-
tions did not necessarily warrant such a move. These results for Britain conﬁrm the work
by Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh (1997) that realignment expectations contributed to the
exchange market pressure on the pound in 1931, and that a disciplined management of the
economic fundamentals alone is not sufﬁcient to maintain the peg. In contrast, the U.S., Ger-
many and France possibly held onto the gold standard too long.
A closer look at the politics of these four countries surrounding the decision to abandon
the peg can help us explain their different responses. In Britain, the suspension of convert-
ibility on September 19, 1931 came in the midst of a government crisis. On August 23rd,
the minority labor government under the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald fell after it had
been unable to adequately respond to the rising reserve losses. It was replaced by a National
Government, again under MacDonald’s leadership, before a general election in October 1931
brought a landslide victory for the conservatives (Eichengreen 1992).
In the U.S. on the other hand, the Hoover administration held onto the gold standard after
Britain left in 1931, even though the predicted survival rates for the U.S. were lower than the
British rates in 1931. Only after the government change in January 1933, the new adminis-
tration under the leadership of F. D. Roosevelt contemplated devaluation. Though Roosevelt
had been purposefully vague about his dollar policies during the campaign, he was respon-
sive to the rising inﬂationist sentiment in congress, and convinced himself that raising prices
12Survival probabilities generated from other model speciﬁcations show very similar results.
16above 1929 levels would be necessary for ending the depression. He thus devalued the dollar
on April 19th 1933, in the midst of the preparations for the World Economic Conference.13
Similarly, the French devaluation followed a government crisis and the rise of the Popular
Front, which pursued inﬂationary policies under the leadership of Leon Blum. The survival
probabilities for Germany clearly indicate that German economic problems started well be-
fore 1929. Germany is also the country with the most dramatic drop in survival probabilities
before leaving the gold standard. This was due to the severe impact of the German bank-
ing crisis in 1931, during which reserve losses forced chancellor Br¨ uning to impose exchange
controls. Br¨ uning’s room for maneuver was furthermore compromised by his minority gov-
erning position.
In the historical narrative the relatively fast recovery of Britain after the crisis is often
associated with the country cutting its ties to the gold standard early (Eichengreen 1992). In
contrast The U.S. and France are seen as having held onto gold far too long. The survival
probabilities generated in this study suggest that Britain did indeed leave the gold standard
early, while the other key countries held onto the regime even after survival probabilities had
fallen below 20%. In Britain, France, and the U.S. a political crisis or government change
contributed to the decision to leave the regime. The German government found itself in a
weak governing position. These events emphasize the importance of domestic politics for
the instability of the inter-war regime.
9 Conclusion
Which factors contributed to the decline of the inter-war gold standard, how can the timing
of countries leaving the regime be explained, and how much weight can be attributed to
institutional and political effects?
The results of this study suggest that higher per capita GDP, higher gold and foreign asset
reserves, trade links with countries on gold, creditor status, and the experience of hyperinﬂa-
tion increased a country’s probability of adhering to the inter-war gold exchange standard.
This conﬁrms the importance of gold imbalances for the inter-war years and highlights a
13For a careful and detailed discussion of the events surrounding the dollar devaluation, compare (Friedman
and Schwartz 1963).
17wealth effect that had already been observed for the classical gold standard. It moreover
stresses the importance of the gold standard to import credibility. In contrast, a country’s
inﬂation rate and adherence to the sterling bloc reduced the probability that a country would
remain on gold. Discount policy and central bank independence did not appear to matter for
gold standard adherence, supporting the theory that countries did not adhere to the ‘rules of
the game’ during the inter-war years.
On the political and institutional side, the explanatory power of democracy for the insta-
bility of the regime is relatively strong. The effects of left of center governments as well as
the partisan veto player variable are not statistically signiﬁcant but the overall measure of
left-oriented representation in parliament is signiﬁcant and positive, conﬁrming that leftist
pressures did contribute to countries’ decisions to abandon the monetary regime.
Survival rates suggest that Britain could be characterized as a fair weather friend, leaving
the gold standard even before predicted survival rates had fallen below 50%. The decision to
abandon the regime was obviously forced by political turmoil. In contrast, the U.S., France,
and to some extent Germany held onto the regime far too long until survival rates had fallen
below 20%. In all countries a political change or crisis contributed to the decision to leave
the gold exchange standard. The example of the inter-war years thus shows how political
and economic effects need to be considered jointly when investigating a countries decision to
maintain or abandon an exchange rate peg.
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21Appendix
Countries Included in the Analysis: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States,
Yugoslavia.
Dependent Variable:
Gold Standard: Dummy variable, taking the value of one for the year in which a country
leaves the gold standard. Data are taken from Bernanke and James (1991) and Eichengreen
(1992). For the present analysis, there is no distinction between a de jure or a de facto ad-
herence to the gold standard. Ofﬁcially abandoning the regime, realigning the exchange rate,
as well as imposing exchange controls are all counted as leaving the regime. Compare with
Table 1 for exact dates on the individual countries.
Independent Variables:
Banking Crises: Time varying dummy variable, taking the value of one for any year in which
a country experienced a banking crisis. Data are taken from Bernanke and James (1991).
Cabinet Change: Number of cabinet changes in a given year per country. Data are taken
from Banks (1971).
Central Bank Independence: Composed of an index for operational independence, ranging
from 1 to 4, with 4 being the most independent. And an index for appointments, again rang-
ing from 1 to 4, with 4 being the most independent. The values are taken from Simmons
(1994) and extended by the author based on League of Nations (1932).
Creditor Status: Dummy variable indicating whether a country was a net creditor or debtor
throughout the gold standard period. Compare Simmons (1994) and Eichengreen (1992).
Democracy: Time varying dummy variable, taking the value of one for any year where a
country could be classiﬁed as democratic, and the value zero for non-democratic classiﬁ-
22cation. Classiﬁcations are taken from Simmons (1994) and Banks (1971). For this analysis,
countries counted as democracies include Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, The United Kingdom, the United States. Non-democratic regimes are Hungary,
Poland, Portugal, Italy, Romania and Brazil. Non of the countries included in the analysis
changed regimes while being on the gold standard. For example in Germany, democracy
ended in 1933 with the coming to power of Hitler’s National Socialist party, but by then the
country had long abandoned the gold standard.
Hyperinﬂation: A dummy variable taking the value of one for countries that experienced
hyperinﬂation in the immediate post-war period. For this analysis only Austria, Poland,
Germany and Hungary are counted as having experienced a severe hyperinﬂation in the im-
mediate post-war period. Classiﬁcations made by the author based on Eichengreen (1992).
Inﬂation: Measured as the percentage deviation from average inﬂation of all countries in-
cluded in the sample. Inﬂation rates are based on annual consumer price indices. Data are
taken from Mitchell (1975).
Left of Center Government: Time varying dummy variable taking the value of one if a coun-
try had a left of center government in a given year. Again, data are taken from Cook and
Paxton (2001) and McHale and Skowronski, eds (1983).
Left Representation in Parliament: Percentage of seats held by left of center parties in parlia-
ment. Data are taken from Cook and Paxton (2001) and McHale and Skowronski, eds (1983).
Partisan Veto Player: Number of parties in the governing coalition. Data are taken from
Cook and Paxton (2001), Spuler (1977), and McHale and Skowronski, eds (1983). For in-
stances where the governing coalition could not be identiﬁed, a minimum required coalition
based on electoral results and seat distribution was computed.
Per Capita GDP: GDP data are taken from Mitchell (1975). Data are missing for Portugal.
23Reserves: Percentage change of gold, silver and foreign currency reserves, held by the gov-
ernment and/or the central bank. Data are taken from League of Nations (1922-1938).
Sterling Bloc: The sterling bloc includes countries with close ties to Great Britain during the
inter-war years, often holding the majority of their reserves in British pounds. The classiﬁca-
tion of countries is taken from Ritschl and Wolff (2004).
Strength of Executive: Variable measure the strength of the executive, classifying direct elec-
tion by popular vote as 1, indirect election as 2, and nonelective executives as 3.
Trade Network: Trade with gold standard countries (imports plus exports) measured as per-
centage of total trade. Data are taken from Mitchell (1975).
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Figure 1: Number of Sample Countries on the Gold Exchange Standard
25Table 1: Countries on the Gold Exchange Standard, 1919-1938
Country Gold Standard Gold Standard Foreign Exchange Devaluation
Adopted Suspended Controls Imposed
Argentina 1927 1929
Austria 1923 1931 10/1931 9/1931
Belgium 1925 1935 3/1935
Brazil 1927 1930
Bulgaria 1927 1931
Canada 7/1926 10/1931 9/1931
Czechoslovakia 4/1926 1931 9/1931 2/1934
Denmark 1/1927 9/1931 11/1931 9/1931
Finland 1926 10/1931 10/1931
France 8/1926 1936 10/1936
Germany 9/1924 1931 7/1931
Greece 1928 1931 9/1931 4/1932
Hungary 4/1925 1931 7/1931
Italy 12/1927 1936 5/1934 10/1936
Netherlands 4/1925 1936 10/1936
Norway 5/1928 1931 9/1931 9/1931
Poland 10/1927 1936 4/1936 10/1936
Portugal 1931 1931
Romania 2/1929 1932 5/1932
Sweden 4/1924 9/1931 9/1931
Switzerland 1925 1936
United Kingdom 5/1925 9/1931 9/1931
U.S. 6/1919 2/1933 3/1933 4/1933
Yugoslavia 1931 1931
Source: Bernanke and James (1991) and Eichengreen (1992).
26Table 2: Summary of Hypothesized Effects
Economic Indicator Sign Political Indicator Sign
GDP per capita (-) Democracy (+)
Gold reserves (-) CB independence (-)
Sterling Bloc (+) Left of center government (+/-)
Inﬂation (-/+) Percentage left in parliament (+/-)
Discount rate (+) Partisan veto players (+/-)
Trade network (+/-) Executive Power (-)




(-) implies the variable is expected to reduce the hazard rate, thereby increasing the
probability that a country remain on gold; (+) implies the variable is expected to increase the
hazard rate, thereby reducing the probability that a country remain on gold; (+/-) implies
the effect is indeterminate.
27Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
regime exit 162 0.15 0.36 0 1
democracy 162 0.78 0.41 0 1
ln GDP 155 8.15 0.48 6.94 8.84
reserves 162 12.25 52.79 -89.75 362.68
sterling 162 0.19 0.39 0 1
central bank indep. 154 4.45 1.85 0 8
inﬂation 159 -2.06 6.78 -35.86 26.76
trade network 155 21.24 17.14 0 99.93
discount rate 152 5.38 2.22 2.00 11.57
banking crisis 159 0.14 0.35 0 1
creditor status 162 0.39 0.49 0 1
hyperinﬂation 159 0.21 0.41 0 1
unemployment 113 11.79 8.07 0.9 37.6
left government 162 0.46 0.50 0 1
percent left in parl. 162 36.79 25.80 0 81.1
partisan veto 162 1.78 1.52 1 6
cabinet change 161 0.69 0.80 0 5
executive 161 2.09 0.52 1 3
28Table 4: Regression Results, dependent variable leaving the gold standard
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
log GDP -1.97** -2.33** -2.58** -2.83** -2.06** -5.54**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
democracy 1.29* 1.25* 1.36* 1.35(*) 1.25(*) 4.63*
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
reserves -0.03** -0.02* -0.02** -0.01 -0.02** -0.1
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.27) (0.02) (0.38)
sterling group 0.95(*) 1.40** 1.94** 0.74 2.41**
(0.11) (0.04) (0.01) (0.33) (0.02)
central bank -0.002
independence (0.99)
inﬂation 0.20** 0.24** 0.20** 0.20*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09)
network -0.05* -0.06** -0.05* -0.02











constant 9.93** 11.51** 14.39** 15.58* 10.00* 29.09*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
q-1 1.88** 2.53** 2.40** 2.75** 3.29** 5.12**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
number of obs. 155 148 150 140 150 108
log likelihood -47.38 -43.25 -40.41 -36.79 -37.07 -21.57
** indicates signiﬁcance at 5%, * indicates signiﬁcance at 10%,
p-values in parentheses.
29Table 5: Regression Results for Democracies, dependent variable leaving the gold standard
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
log GDP -2.25** -3.30** -3.59** -3.13** -1.81 -5.30** -4.35** -4.44**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.13) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
reserves -0.04** -0.03** -0.03** -0.02 -0.03** -0.01 -0.02* -0.02*
(0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.16) (0.05) (0.42) (0.08) (0.06)
sterling 1.56** 1.95** 2.73** 0.84 2.23** 2.21** 2.39**
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.40) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
central bank -0.06
independence (0.78)
inﬂation 0.25** 0.31** 0.26** 0.19* 0.31** 0.31**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01)
network -0.05 -0.07* -0.09* -0.02 -0.07* -0.08**











left leaning -1.21 -1.48
government (0.24) (0.17)








constant 12.44** 17.17** 21.26** 14.03 7.13 32.96* 25.41** 24.34**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.27) (0.43) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02)
q-1 2.43** 4.38** 3.86** 4.93** 5.11** 4.47** 4.13** 4.28**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
number of obs. 123 120 122 116 122 100 122 122
log likelihood -31.54 -26.20 -25.84 -22.56 -22.08 -19.96 -24.17 -23.71
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Figure 3: Survival Rates for Germany and France
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